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Rethinking Financial Regulation
By Thomas M. Hoenig
I
n recent years, revolutionary changes in
financial markets, combined with incidents
such as Barings and Daiwa, have revived
concerns about the adequacy of financial regula-
tion. Historically, financial regulatory policy has
been driven by the view that to maintain the
health of the financial system you must maintain
the health of individual institutions. Accord-
ingly, if institutions are protected from failure
through regulation of capital and prudential
supervision, the viability of the system is ensured
and the risks to the explicit or implied government
safety nets that protect financial institutions are
minimized. Indeed, recent discussions about how
to deal with incidents such as Barings and Daiwa
have centered on ways to extend the traditional
safety and soundness regulation of individual
institutions to incorporate an increased emphasis
on risk management policies and procedures.
In light of ongoing changes in financial mar-
kets, however, extending the traditional approach
to financial market regulation may not work.
Extending the traditional approach may be too
costly and difficult, especially for large, globally
active institutions, because of the complexities of
many new activities and financial instruments.
Given these difficulties, it seems appropriate to
ask whether there is an alternative regulatory
approach to promoting financial stability and
protecting government safety nets without sacri-
ficing efficiency or stifling innovation.
My comments today are designed to provide
some thoughts on possible alternatives. Two
changes in emphasis to the regulatory system are
discussed. First, instead of regulating to make
institutions fail-safe, an alternative approach is
to strengthen the stability of the financial system
by designing procedures that prevent large inter-
bank  exposures in the payments system and
interbank deposits. Second, although moral haz-
ard problems can be contained through tradi-
tional regulatory approaches, an alternative is to
require those institutions that engage in an
expanding array of complex activities to give up
direct access to government safety nets in return
for reduced regulation and oversight. By further
emphasizing these elements within the regulatory
system over expanded micromanagement, indi-
vidual institutions could be permitted to engage
in new activities and sometimes to fail because
financial stability would be less threatened by the
failure of an individual banklarge or small,
global or domestic. At the same time, the cost of
protecting the safety nets would be better con-
fined because traditional regulation would focus
on traditional banks that choose to have access
to the safety nets. 
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on February 2, 1996.THE CHANGING FINANCIAL SYSTEM
In recent years, financial markets around the
world have experienced significant structural
changes. Some of the more important changes
are the growing importance of capital markets in
credit intermediation, the emergence of markets
for intermediating risks, changes in the activities
and risk profiles of financial institutions, and the
increasingly global nature of financial interme-
diation. These changes have been spurred largely
by a technological revolution that has reduced
the costs of information gathering, processing,
and transmission. As this information revolu-
tion continues, there is little doubt that the
changes in financial markets will also continue.
More than ever before, banks face greater com-
petition from other financial institutions. Many
businesses are turning away from banks and
other depository institutions and directly toward
capital markets and nonbank intermediaries for
their funding needs. In the United States, for
example, banks have lost market share in the
short-term lending market to commercial paper
and finance company loans. Over the past 25
years, bank loans as a share of short-term debt on
the books of nonfinancial corporations have
fallen from about 80 percent to about 50 percent.
In addition, corporations have greater access to
other sources of finance, such as medium-term
note facilities and junk bonds. Similar move-
ments away from banks and toward capital markets
have occurred in Europe, although the move-
ment started later and has not been as large as in
the United States. As these changes occur, finan-
cial activities are increasingly taking place outside
of the traditional bank regulatory framework.
Another change is that intermediation has
expanded in scope from credit intermediation to
risk intermediation. In particular, growth in the
markets for both off-balance and on-balance
sheet derivatives has skyrocketed. These markets
allow banks to intermediate risk by unbundling
the total risk of an asset into its component parts
and then transferring combinations of those
components to those who are most willing and
able to bear the risks. As a result, both financial
institutions and nonfinancial corporations are
more able to actively manage the risk charac-
teristics of their portfolios.
The increased competition in traditional lines
of business and the opportunities in capital and
derivatives markets have led the largest domestic
and global banks to significantly alter their ac-
tivities and products. Among the most signifi-
cant of the new activities are trading and
market-making in money markets, capital mar-
kets, foreign exchange, and derivatives. 
The rise in proprietary trading, market-making,
and active portfolio management has also dra-
matically altered the risk profiles of financial
institutions. If used properly for portfolio man-
agement, new financial instruments can certainly
reduce an institutions risk exposure and raise its
profitability and viability in the financial mar-
ketplace. If used improperly, however, they
expose the institution to sudden, extraordinary
losses, raising the likelihood of failure. Moreover,
the risks and opportunities for failure are often
exacerbated by the leverage associated with the
new activities and the larger numbers of players
and greater degree of anonymity in financial
markets. Increased trading activity, for example,
has significantly increased the exposure of banks
to market riskthe risk of loss due to changes in
asset prices and the volatility of asset prices. Like
traditional credit risk, market risk can lead to
significant losses and ultimately to failure if not
managed appropriately. In contrast to credit-
related losses, which can take time to develop,
losses due to market risk can occur quickly. The
Barings failure is a prime example of how quickly
a large exposure to market risk can cause an
institution to failthe bulk of its net losses
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A final structural change is that financial inter-
mediation has become more global, sweeping
aside regional and national borders. In banking,
for example, the share of U.S. business loans
made by foreign banks rose from about 20 per-
cent in the early 1980s to about 50 percent in the
early 1990s. On the other hand, non-U.S. corpo-
rations are increasingly turning to U.S. financial
firms for their credit needs and financial advice.
For example, seven of the top ten merger advisers
worldwide are American financial institutions,
and each of the top four global underwriters over
the past three years have been American firms.
CAN THE TRADITIONAL
REGULATORY APPROACH KEEP
PACE WITH THE CHANGES? 
Understandably, regulators have adapted to the
ongoing financial market changes by extending
traditional safety and soundness regulatory prac-
ticescapital requirements for intermediaries
have been raised and adjusted to incorporate new
risks, and the emphasis of prudential supervision
on risk management has been significantly
increased. In light of the changes in financial
markets, however, simply extending the tradi-
tional regulatory approach to achieve the goals
of financial regulation may be too difficult and
costly. But before looking at some of the problems
with extending traditional regulation, I think we
must first take a closer look at the objectives of
financial regulation.
The goals of financial regulation
Most people would agree that the principal
goal of financial regulation is to promote finan-
cial market stability. In an operational sense, this
means that financial market disruptions should
not have a significant impact on aggregate real
economic activity. This definition suggests that
the failure of an individual financial institution,
even a large institution, should not be a concern
unless it is allowed to propagate or become
systemic. By itself, the failure of a single, large
institution is unlikely to have a great effect on
aggregate output because the total assets of even
the largest financial firms account for only a
small share of aggregate output. When Drexel,
Burnham, Lambert failed in 1990, for example,
there was no noticeable or lasting effect on eco-
nomic activity. As we know from the banking
panics of the late 1800s and early 1900s, however,
failures that propagate through the financial
system can have disastrous consequences for the
real economy.
The primary ingredients that make it possible
for problems at a few institutions to spread to
many are the use of extensive leverage by these
institutions and their direct ties to the payment
system. For example, the failure of a single bank
could spread to other banks that have large credit
exposures to the failing bank through clearing-
houses and correspondent deposits. The failure
of these banks, in turn, could spread to other
institutions in a similar manner.
As it turns out, actual losses are rarely large
enough to turn the financial problems of only a
few institutions into a systemwide financial
panic. Nevertheless, the mere possibility that losses
can spread, combined with customer uncertainty
about the condition of their banks, can cause
depositors and other creditors to lose confidence
and run on their banksboth problem and
healthy banks alike. In a fractional reserve bank-
ing system, bank customers know their deposits
are not backed by liquid assets. As a result, if
customers are uncertain about the condition of
their banks and their funds are not guaranteed,
the only certain way they can get all of their
money is to be one of the first to withdraw funds
before the bank fails. And when a large fraction
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way, even solvent banks can fail.
In the United States, the problem of bank runs
was solved by the creation of deposit insurance.
Other countries also have explicit or implied
government guarantees backing their financial
institutions. With such guarantees, depositors
and creditors have no reason to run when prob-
lems occur at banks other than their own. Indeed,
they have no reason to run even if they think
their own bank might fail.
Such guarantees and the associated loss of market
discipline as an effective check on institutional
excesses, however, lead to another problem
namely, the moral hazard that institutions will take
excessive risks. While preventing runs on solvent
institutions is desirable, preventing runs on insol-
vent institutions is not. The threat of failure keeps
a bank honest and inhibits it and the industry
from trending toward excessive risks. Without
this market discipline provided by creditors willing
to withdraw their funds when they suspect a bank
of being unsafe, banks have an incentive to take
excessive risks. While these risks are borne by the
banks, they are also partly borne by taxpayers and
others who fund the financial safety nets. In the
United States, for example, the risks are borne by
the healthy banks who fund the deposit insur-
ance system, by their customers who pay the costs
through higher loan rates and lower deposit rates,
and  ultimately, as we learned from the U.S.
savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, by taxpayers.
The moral hazard caused by deposit insurance
creates a second reason for financial regulation.
Since insured depositors no longer have an incen-
tive to monitor and discipline banks, someone
else must take over the responsibility of preventing
banks from imposing the costs of excessive risk-
taking on the safety nets. This responsibility has
naturally fallen to those agencies who are already
regulating banks.
Problems in extending the traditional
regulatory approach
The traditional approach to maintaining finan-
cial stability and to protecting government safety
nets is safety and soundness regulation. While
safety and soundness regulation has evolved
through the years, the premise that underlies this
approach is that the best way to maintain the
health of the financial system is to maintain the
health of individual institutions. According to
this view, if institutions are protected from
failure through regulation of capital and pru-
dential supervision, the health of the system is
ensured and potential risks to the safety nets are
minimized.
The regulatory changes of the past decade have
largely been within the context of this traditional
approach. The raising of capital requirements
and the incorporation of risk into capital require-
ments in accordance with the 1988 Basle Accord
on capital standards are an example of how the
traditional approach to regulation has been
extended. In addition, in the United States, laws
such as the FDIC Improvement Act were passed
in response to the S&L crisis and the bank failures
of the 1980s and early 1990s to reduce the likeli-
hood of future failures. 
More recently, discussion in the United States
and abroad has turned its attention to how
regulation should respond to the ongoing
changes in financial markets and to the Barings
and Daiwa incidents. The discussion has focused
on extending the traditional regulatory system by
substantially increasing the degree of oversight of
a banks risk management and internal opera-
tions, especially for large, globally active institu-
tions. In the United States, for example, the
Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency have both started supervision
by risk programs that increase the focus of bank
examinations on risk management processes.
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costly. Given the extent of the ongoing changes in
financial markets, an extension of traditional
safety and soundness regulation may not be
effective. The biggest problem with extending
safety and soundness regulation is that it is costly
and difficult to implement for those institu-
tions that are engaging in more active portfolio
management and extensive trading and market-
making activities. One reason it is so difficult is
that many of the new activities and financial
instruments and the associated risks and risk
management practices are extremely complex. As
a result, examiners need to develop the expertise
to understand and keep pace with the continuing
evolution of asset valuation models and risk
management techniques and processes. This dif-
ficulty is not meant as a criticism of the capabili-
ties of bank examiners; rather, the point is that
the private sector has significantly more re-
sourcesboth human and financialthan the
regulators for keeping pace with the changes in
financial markets. 
For example, consider the Basle Committees
recent revision to the capital adequacy standards
to incorporate market risk. The Committees
capital standards allow banks to use their own
value-at-risk models to determine the amount of
capital necessary to protect themselves from mar-
ket risk. Clearly, banks need to use their own
models to effectively manage risk. To effectively
supervise banks that use their own models, how-
ever, examiners need to have the expertise to
judge the adequacy of the models and the risk
management practices. At a minimum, this re-
quires understanding the quantitative aspects of
the model, such as its statistical structure, its
accuracy in valuing assets, and the adequacy of
the stress tests used to determine the financial
consequences of large movements in interest rates
and asset prices. In addition, examiners must
understand  the qualitative aspects of a risk man-
agement strategy, such as how management uses
the models information and ensures compliance
with its risk management strategy. Indeed, the
Barings and Daiwa episodes are prime examples
of the importance of these qualitative aspects.
The lack of internal controls that monitor com-
pliance with managements risk strategy is the
reason that these institutions exposure to market
risk was able to rise to extreme levels. Overall,
then, examiners have to know as much about a
bank, its model, and control procedures as the
rocket scientists who built the model and the
management team who designed the risk manage-
ment strategy.
The complexity of the new activities and instru-
ments also makes traditional safety and sound-
ness regulation more difficult by making
traditional capital regulation less meaningful.
Capital is harder to measure because it is increas-
ingly difficult to assess the value of many of the
new assets that are not regularly traded, such as
over-the-counter derivatives and structured notes.
Moreover, balance sheet information that is
reported at, say, quarterly intervals is less useful
because it is only a snapshot of a portfolio whose
value can change dramatically within a day. Also,
the pure lack of information about many off-
balance sheet activities makes it more difficult to
assess capital adequacy.
The complexity of the new activities is not the
only reason it is more difficult to extend tradi-
tional regulationanother reason is the erasure
of national borders. With the globalization of
finance, uncertainty about regulatory responsi-
bility and the difficulty of coordinating regula-
tory policies across international agencies have
made it easier for problems to go undetected or
undisciplined. In the United States, for example,
steps were taken after the BCCI failure to prevent
global institutions from slipping through the
regulatory cracks. The recent Daiwa incident,
however, indicates the difficulty of solving these
problems. 
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more difficult and costly due to the growth of
financial activity taking place outside of the
banking industry and the traditional bank regu-
latory system. At a minimum, the growth of
activities outside of banking requires bank regu-
lators to coordinate their policies with the regu-
lators of other types of financial institutions,
such as securities and insurance firms. In addi-
tion, to the extent nonbank activity exposes the
financial system to systemic risks, extending the
traditional regulatory approach might require
extending safety and soundness regulation to
other types of financial institutions. This is not
only economically costly, but is also probably
politically infeasible.
Extending traditional regulation could reduce finan-
cial efficiency. A second problem with extending
the traditional approach to regulation is that to
the extent it makes regulation more intrusive, the
efficiency of the financial system is reduced.
More intrusive regulation can substantially increase
compliance costs. In the United States, for exam-
ple, the FDIC Improvement Act included certain
micromanagement provisions that were costly to
implement and monitor. 
Efficiency is also reduced because regulatory
restrictions, by their nature, slow innovation and
spawn attempts to avoid the restrictions. In the
United States, the banking industry has devoted
significant resources to avoiding and lobbying
against laws that prevent it from expanding geo-
graphically and from engaging in other financial
activities, such as securities underwriting and
insurance sales.
Extending traditional regulation might not ensure
financial stability. Finally, history is replete with
examples of regulation that have led to less,
rather than more, stability in an industryboth
financial and nonfinancial. One reason stability
may decline is that regulation often limits the
ability of institutions to adapt to changing mar-
ket conditions. The U.S. savings and loan crisis
in the 1980s is a prime example of how the
inability to adapt can wreak havoc on an industry.
ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION
In light of the problems with simply extending
safety and soundness regulation, it is natural to
ask whether there is an alternative to the tradi-
tional approach. Specifically, is it possible to
promote financial stability and protect the safety
nets from moral hazard problems in a cost effec-
tive way that does not sacrifice efficiency, stifle
innovation, or create alternative sources of insta-
bility? While I make no pretense that we should
abandon all aspects of traditional forms of regu-
lation, I would like to outline two changes that
should receive greater emphasis in lieu of expand-
ing our current system. The first change would
promote financial stability by expanding efforts
at reducing large interbank credit exposures in
the payments system and interbank deposits. The
second change would protect government safety
nets by requiring those institutions that engage
in complex activities to give up direct access to
the safety nets. In return, these institutions would
receive reduced regulation and regulatory over-
sight. The primary advantages of these features
are that financial stability would be threatened
less by an individual banklarge or small, global
or domesticwhile the cost of protecting the
safety nets would be limited by focusing tradi-
tional regulation on traditional banks that
choose to have access to the safety nets.
How could regulation be changed?
The first step in building an alternative regula-
tory approach is to go back to the beginning and
rethink why we are regulating the financial sys-
tem. As was discussed earlier, a key to ensuring
financial stability is to prevent the failure of an
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the payments system to an economywide finan-
cial crisis. The current approach to protecting the
financial system from the propagation of finan-
cial disturbances is to try to prevent problems
from occurring at individual institutions in the
first place by regulating the activities of banks
and other financial institutions.
An alternative solution is to set up mechanisms
that prevent problems that do occur from spread-
ing to other institutions. Specifically, measures
such as collateral requirements, debit caps, and
pricing of intraday credit can be used to prevent
large interbank credit exposures in the payments
system. In addition, limits on interbank deposit
exposures and on loans to a single borrower can
further protect the economy from problems at
both bank and nonbank financial institutions.
By limiting interbank exposures, problems at a
particular institution cannot threaten the viabil-
ity of any other institution. As a result, any
institutionbig or smallcould fail without
threatening financial stability.
In the United States, we have made some
progress in reducing the vulnerability of the
payments system to the failures of individual
financial institutions. On large-dollar payments
systems, such as Fedwire (the Federal Reserves
electronic funds transfer system) and the Clear-
ing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS),
the payments system is protected by a combina-
tion of fees on daylight overdrafts, collateral
requirements for institutions using the payments
systems, well-defined loss allocation formulas to
ensure settlement in cases of default, and over-
draft and net debit caps. In addition, the FDIC
Improvement Act set caps on some interbank
deposits. Specifically, banks that have deposits at
correspondents who are classified as less than
adequately capitalized must limit their interday
credit exposure to no more than 25 percent of
their capital. Further progress needs to be made
in this area, particularly in the settlement of
foreign exchange and other international trans-
actions where nonsynchronous operating hours
and other institutional features continue to expose
banks and other firms to considerable risks.
Even if large interbank exposures are limited,
however, safety and soundness regulation is
needed to protect government safety nets from
the moral hazard problems at institutions pro-
tected by the safety nets. In light of the costs and
difficulties of implementing prudential supervi-
sion for larger institutions who are increasingly
involved in new activities and industries, the time
may have come to sever the link between these
institutions and the safety nets, making it feasible
to significantly scale back regulatory oversight of
their operations. This could be accomplished by
not allowing these institutions to offer deposits
backed by government guarantees. Such institu-
tions could still offer safe deposits, but they
would have to be guaranteed in other ways, such
as by collateralizing the deposits or by offering
the deposits through insulated subsidiaries that
only engage in relatively safe activities. In addition,
access to central bank discount window loans
would be minimized so that these institutions
would not have the option of asking the central
bank for a loan if they got into trouble. Because
these institutions would not have direct access to
government safety nets and would not expose
other banks to risks through the payments sys-
tem, it would not be necessary to subject these
institutions to extensive regulation. 
It is important to emphasize that the lack of
direct access to the safety nets would only apply
to those institutions that are involved in new and
more complex activities and not to the vast
majority of institutions that continue to engage
in traditional lending and investment activities.
These traditional institutions would continue
to operate and be regulated much as they are
today.
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In light of the recent changes in financial
markets and the likelihood that the markets will
continue to evolve, the regulatory changes dis-
cussed above have several advantages over a pol-
icy of simply extending traditional safety and
soundness regulation.
· First, by preventing large interbank exposures,
financial stability would not be threatened by
any individual banklarge or small, global or
domestic.
· Second, by limiting access to government safety
nets to those institutions who engage in tradi-
tional activities, the safety nets would be less
exposed to the moral hazard problems. More-
over, this approach is feasible and not too
costly or difficult to implement. Specifically,
since banks involved in complex activities that
are difficult and costly to regulate would pose
a reduced threat to the safety nets, they would
be subject to less regulation. Institutions that
choose to retain direct access to the safety nets,
however, would continue to be regulated as
they are now.
· Third, it follows from the first two advantages
that there is much less of a rationale for a policy
that makes some banks too big to fail. Under
the current regulatory system, regulators are
unlikely to allow large, globally active banks to
fail because of the potential systemic problems
and the threat to government safety nets. With
the changes in the regulatory emphasis that I
am proposing, however, the financial system
and safety nets would be better insulated from
large failures.
· Finally, since traditional regulation would not
be extended for those institutions involved in
new activities, the changes described above
would not produce some of the other problems
associated with extending the traditional regu-
latory system. For example, banks involved in
nontraditional activities would not face an
increase in compliance costs and would have
no need to devote resources to avoiding new
regulations. In addition, the changes would
allow banks to adapt to changes in the financial
and economic environment. As a result, the
proposed changes would not stifle innovation
or reduce the efficiency of the financial system.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
I would like to conclude by placing my
thoughts on financial regulation in a somewhat
broader context. The premise of my remarks is
that it is becoming increasingly difficult for
financial regulation to keep up with the complex-
ity of the changes in financial markets. Specifi-
cally, it is becoming too costly and difficult to
effectively monitor the activities of large, globally
active institutions that are involved in nontradi-
tional financial activities. Simply extending tra-
ditional methods of regulation to cope with these
changes may not be the best way to promote a
stable and efficient financial system.
The alternative, however, is not to throw up
our hands, turn away from regulation, and rely
exclusively on market discipline to create a better
financial system. Market discipline by itself can-
not solve all of the systemic problems or moral
hazard issues. What I am suggesting is for us to
focus on the issue of systemic risk by placing an
emphasis on efforts to strengthen the ability of
the financial system to cope with the failure of
individual institutions. In addition, while moral
hazard problems can be dealt with by traditional
regulation, an alternative is to lessen access to
government  safety nets for those institutions that
pursue complex, nontraditional activities. It is
important to realize that such an approach does
not require a radical change in regulatory prac-
tices, merely the recognition that institutions
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regulated differently. Indeed, the majority of
depository institutions would continue to have
access to government safety nets and would con-
tinue to operate and be regulated as they are
today.
Although the approach I am suggesting should
result in a more stable and efficient financial
system in the long run, it would not eliminate
the possibility of macroeconomic disruptions
causing financial crises that may affect the health
of a large number of financial institutions. As a
result, central banks will continue to have an
important role in promoting stability of the
economy and in providing liquidity to the finan-
cial system in times of crisis. Thus, it is crucial
that central banks pursue macroeconomic poli-
cies that preserve economic and financial stabil-
ity. In addition, if a large macroeconomic or
financial shock to the economy should occur,
central banks must be able to respond quickly by
providing the liquidity necessary to maintain the
smooth functioning of the financial system. 
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